You Know Sink the Maine Again or Something

Sheldon G. Stern served as historian at the JFK Library in Boston from 1977 to 2000. He is the author of Averting 'the Final Failure': John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings (2003), The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Undercover Cuban Missile Crisis (2005) and The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths vs. Reality (2012) in the Stanford Academy Press Nuclear Age Serial. Dr. Stern was the outset historian and non- ExComm participant to listen to and evaluate the then-classified Cuban Missile Crisis recordings.

Response to Matthew Hayes: "Robert Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Reassertion of Robert Kennedy's Office as the President'southward 'Indispensable Partner' in the Successful Resolution of the Crunch," History, The Historical Association and John Wiley and Sons Ltd (May vii, 2019), 473-503 and "RFK'southward Secret Role in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Scientific American (August 6, 2019).

I was naturally intrigued when I learned most a purportedly new take on Robert Kennedy'due south role in the Cuban Missile crunch. The unique personal/official human relationship betwixt President John F. Kennedy and his younger brother Robert has been thoroughly explored in dozens of studies over the last half century. RFK's "portfolio," widely understood at the fourth dimension, was that of JFK's most trusted adviser and confidant—and, as Hayes suggests, "the president's de facto chief of staff." A different attorney general would likely not even have been invited to take part in secret discussions during a dangerous foreign policy crisis. The loyalty and trust between the Kennedy brothers volition surely remain a 1-off in the history of the American presidency.

Matthew Hayes' work confirms the already well-documented story of RFK'due south unique office, especially his JFK-approved back-channel contacts with Soviet diplomats before, during and after the missile crisis; he emphasizes, however, the importance of the more than than 3,500 recently declassified documents which confirm that the attorney general was overseeing interdepartmental planning for possible contingencies in Cuba—including "the installation of missile sites" and "warning his brother of the possibility over a year before the crisis." [Scientific American2 (v page printout); futureSA] Hayes cites Cuba-related documents which undeniably confirm that RFK was not your conventional attorney general. These examples augment the historical tape but fail to provide annihilationgenuinely newnear the bond between President Kennedy and the brother eight years his junior. [History32-35, 38,42; time to comeHY]

"In the beginning days of the crisis," referring directly to the ExComm tapes, Hayes contends that RFK "insisted that an invasion remain on the table and even pushed for a reduction in lead time required to initiate one.Until recently(italics added) this arroyo was held upward as bear witness for a belligerent, hawkish adviser, promoting the sort of military action that would have led to dangerous escalation." (SAiii) In fact, from 1962 to the declassification of the White House tape recordings in the late 1990s, historians took for granted that RFK was thetop doveat the meetings—mainly because of his posthumous 1969 memoir,Thirteen Days(which has never been out of print). Hayes declares that:

He saw his role as pressing for all alternatives, regardless of where they might lead. … he was instrumental in convincing other directorate of its [the naval blockade's] merits and, ultimately, the president. In both cases he was able to do then because he was seen as balancing resolve with restraint, bridging the more forceful arroyo advocated by the armed services and Joint Chiefs with the optimistic diplomacy pushed by dovish directorate such as U.Northward. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson."[SAthree]

The quote in a higher place is a historical rope of sand. RFK merely briefly and reluctantly backed the blockade and continued to grumble about it well subsequently the president had endorsed it; he certainly did not convince the JCS to support it: they never did. There is no escaping or rationalizing the facts—the tapes have irrefutably identified RFK equally one of the most contentious ExComm hawks—from day one to day thirteen. Hayes is, in effect, turning the historiography of the missile crisis upside downwards, as if these new documents ["Until recently"] tin can somehow explain away the substance and tone of what Robert Kennedy actually and repeatedly said in the recorded meetings—but advisedly concealed inThirteen Days. RFK'southward role as chair of the Special Group Augmented, fifty-fifty more thoroughly documented since 2012, (https://world wide web.jfklibrary.org/nugget-viewer/archives/RFKAG) is entirely consequent with his hawkish views in the ExComm meetings—in which he certainly didnotreveal an "innate understanding of the missile crisis as more than a political struggle than a armed forces one, with its own limitations." [SA2;HY480] Hayes' nebulous claim that these "declassified private notes and a closer understanding of the brothers' intimate relationship, now support a more holistic view of RFK," fails to even dent the indisputable historical record on the White Business firm tapes.

RFK's key responsibilities included chairing the Special Group Augmented which coordinated Functioning Mongoose in Cuba, overseeing industrial and agricultural sabotage, which some historians have called 'state-sponsored terrorism,' besides as attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro. Richard Helms, CIA deputy director for operations, recalled: "If anybody wants to encounter the whiplashes across my back inflicted by Bobby Kennedy, I will accept my shirt off in public." A senior Mongoose planner agreed, "That's how he [RFK] felt about this stuff. Information technology was unbelievable. I accept never been in anything like that before or since and I don't ever want to go through it again." [Stern,Averting the Concluding Failure14; futurityAV] Hayes never even mentions the Special Group Augmented.

Hayes' give-and-take of the "Trollope Ploy," (hereafter TP: a reference to a plot device in a 19th century Anthony Trollope novel) is even more problematic. He explains the TP equally "a bold strategy for navigating two different proposals from Khrushchev…within the space of a few hours." The kickoff (tardily on 10/26) promised to remove the missiles if the United states of america pledged non to invade Republic of cuba; the second (early on 10/27), asserted publicly on Moscow Radio that the missiles would exist removed if the US withdrew the Jupiter missiles from Turkey. "RFK took hold of the situation," Hayes concludes, "assuming the leadership mantle." He and the president'due south chief speechwriter, Ted Sorensen, went into a split room and came upwards with what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called an idea of "breathtaking simplicity:" "we ignore the latest [10/27] Khrushchev alphabetic character [Hayes incorrectly substitutes "while barely acknowledging receipt of the second"] and respond to his earlier [ten/26] letter of the alphabet's proposal." [SA4;Thirteen Days,1971 edition,77] "JFK approved the ploy," and sent RFK to brand what Hayes calls a "highly clandestine assurance to [Soviet Ambassador] Dobrynin that the missiles would be removed 'at a later engagement.'"

This business relationship, nonetheless,is not what happened!The tapes reveal conclusively that JFK remained very skeptical and only grudgingly and unenthusiastically agreed "to try this affair [the TP];" but also demanded new contacts with Turkey and NATO to convince them to give up the Jupiters because Khrushchev "had moved on" and could not go back to his earlier demand for a not-invasion pledge subsequently his public statement about a trade. The entire ExComm—very much including RFK—continued tovigorously oppose the merchandise. The existent breakthrough did not occur until the belatedly evening rump meeting (about 20 minutes) of 7 ExComm members, chosen and invited by the president himself. (JFK failed to activate the record recorder and we volition never know if he acted deliberately or just forgot.) Secretary of State Dean Rusk, finally acknowledging the president's determination about giving up the missiles in Turkey, suggested requiring that the Soviets keep the swap secret; the president accepted this recommendation and everyone finally acquiesced—however reluctantly. The president, in brusk, never let go of "the leadership pall." As Barton Bernstein observed, "they were the president's men and he wasthe president." [AV369]

It was JFK himself who start utilized the TP myth. Just hours later on Khrushchev had agreed on 10/28 to the removal of the missiles in Cuba, the president phoned his three White House predecessors (Eisenhower, Truman, and Hoover) and skillfully lied to them, challenge that Khrushchev had retreated from the ten/27 missile trade proposal and had agreed, in the finish, to remove the Cuba missiles in substitution for a non-invasion pledge. Eisenhower, who had dealt with Khrushchev, was skeptical and asked if the Soviet leader had demanded additional concessions; JFK coolly repeated the contrived assistants cover story. The same version was fed to a gullible press corps and chop-chop became the conventional wisdom, later enshrined inThirteen Days. [AV388]

Hayes criticizes my piece of work for "dismissing the accounts of early [missile crunch] historians such as Schlesinger as 'greatly misleading if not out-and-out deceptive.'" [HY476] This accusation is irresponsible as well as fake. Starting time, the quoted passage really refers to1 certificatefrom the showtime day of the ExComm meetings institute in RFK's papers past Schlesinger (granted special admission by the family in the 1970s). Second, I explicitly warned readers that "Schlesinger could not have known the full context of the RFK quote" at the time considering the tapes were still classified. My judgment has naught whatsoever to do with the 'early on [missile crisis] historians.' If there is deception hither, the deception was neither Schlesinger'south nor mine. [AM34-5]

"Historians such as Sheldon Stern," Hayes maintains, "have argued that President Kennedy 'bore a substantial share of the responsibility'" for precipitating the crunch. Hayes, however, chooses to phone call the missile crunch i of the Kennedy administration's "principal moments of glory" and "a heroic and ingenious defense confronting Soviet aggression." [HA476]

This "moment of celebrity," "heroic and ingenious" language is unprofessional advocacy, adjoining on hagiography, and is particularly inexplainable considering there is a huge corporeality of evidence (including in Soviet archives) which confirms Khrushchev's claim that the missiles were sent to Republic of cuba to defend Castro confronting a 2nd Usa-backed invasion. Hayes, even so, dances effectually RFK'south dominant role in the Special Group Augmented and Performance Mongoose, which in reality aimed "to undermine the Cuban regime and economy by blowing upwardly port and oil storage facilities, burning crops (especially sugarcane) and fifty-fifty disabling or assassinating Castro himself. … Information technology became the largest secret operation in CIA history upward to that time, 'involving some 400 agents, an annual budget of over $50 one thousand thousand.'" [AV15] Hayes acknowledges that RFK was the president's "optics and ears in Mongoose," (HY495) but otherwise ignores RFK'due south fervent leadership role in that effort.

"Stern," Hayes complains, "continues to quote a second-manus exchange between RFK and Kenneth O'Donnell, JFK's special banana and confidant during the crisis, to undermine the veracity of RFK's memoirThirteen Days." After reading the manuscript, "O'Donnell is said to have exclaimed, 'I idea your blood brother was president during the missile crisis!', while RFK replied, 'He's not running [for office], and I am.'" Hayes insists that this business relationship "past someone who didn't participate in most of the ExComm meetings should surely non exist given so much prominence." [HY478] This is an apples and oranges argument: the remark isnotabout the meetings or the crisis, just instead most O'Donnell's shrewd insight into RFK's personal, political motives in writing his memoir. (Of the iv people present, the surviving two I consulted vividly recalled and confirmed each other'south business relationship.)

That ambition is precisely what O'Donnell, known for his candor and directness, immediately perceived and RFK promptly admitted. RFK initially intended this crunch memoir for publication during JFK'due south 1964 reelection campaign, but changed his purpose subsequently Dallas. Bobby's ambition, in fact, had even surfaced during the crisis itself. On October 29, Ambassador Dobrynin gave the attorney general a letter from Khrushchev to the president which specifically mentioned the missile merchandise. RFK consulted with JFK and returned the letter, reminding Dobrynin that the bandy was to remain undercover—and explaining that he personally could not "risk getting involved in the transmission of this sort of letter, since who knows where and when such messages can surface or be somehow published—not at present, only in the future…. The advent of such a document could cause irreparable damage to my political career in the time to come." [AV403] The O'Donnell/RFK exchange is an entirely legitimate nugget of historical testify and Hayes' objection is disingenuous special pleading.

"Critics such every bit Stern," Hayes continues,[HY483-four]

far from viewing RFK equally a leader of the doves (through his back up for the occludent route), point to the primary source material and advocate his office every bit a dangerous hawk advocating invasion from the commencement.

In evidence for this exclamation, Stern directly quotes RFK: 'We should but get into it, and go it over with and take our losses if [Khrushchev] wants to get into a war over this.'… Stern argues that RFK's memoir of the crunch 'was an effort to manipulate this history of the missiles crunch and invent the past. A 'consistently hawkish' figure emerges from Stern's analysis of RFK, 'ane in sharp contrast to his brother.'

I don't "view" RFK every bit "the leader of the doves" considering he was not; he accepted the occludent only after JFK publicly announced it. I plead guilty as charged to pointing "to the primary source fabric," the tapes, to prove conclusively (not to "abet") that RFK was a hawk on the first day and was still pressing to "take Cuba back" militarily on the thirteenth day. The "consistently hawkish figure" that rankles Hayes was not invented by "Stern's analysis"—but derived from RFK's own words captured on the ExComm tapes, words which he spunvery differently in his memoir. The assertion that 'I was there' is most oftentimes a ruby-red flag for historical manipulation, not a superior grade of validation. History based on private retention rarely rises above the personal motives for writing it.Thirteen Daysand the tape recordings cannot both be right, and there is absolutely no question which account is reliable.

Hayes, however, cites a specific case to allege that "this analysis is skewed, for Stern quotes RFK out of context, paring dorsum RFK'south words selectively to back up his argument." The indented quote below, he claims, "really begins with a series of qualifications, as RFKtentatively hedges his comments."

At present [think] whether it wouldn't be the argument, if y'all're going to get into it at all, whether we should just become into it, and go it over with, and take our losses. And if [Khrushchev] wants to get into a state of war over this . . . Hell, if information technology'due south war that's gonna come up on this affair, he sticks those kinds of missiles in after the warning, then he's gonna get into a state of war over six months from now, or a year from at present…. [HY483]

Accusing a scholar of "selectively" using evidence "to support an argument," is a serious personal and professional allegation—specially when untrue. This passage is not, as Hayes is determined to "show"  in spite of the ExComm tapes, some one-off, devil's advocate musing by Bobby earlier he settled on a dovish line; rather, information technology is typical of his arroyo through the entire crisis. I just relistened to this record and there is no question that before the "become into it" comment RFK is overtly scoffing at all suggestions of more express activity (such as air strikes) rather than invasion. Indeed, adding the "Now [retrieve]…." sentence makes no change whatsoever in the meaning of his remarks. He is not "tentatively" hedging anything. In fact, Bobby makes his position abundantly articulate minutes later, suggesting that the administration could stage an incident that would justify armed forces intervention: "Y'all know, sink theMaineagain or something." I included the 'sink theMaine' statement after in my narrative – yet Hayes leaves it out entirely. A reader might reasonably inquire just whose version is skewed and selective.

As important, the indented quote above first appeared in the 1997 May-Zelikow transcripts, which I was the outset to publicly betrayal every bit seriously flawed and unreliable. (AV,' Appendix, 427-439.) Naught in the Hayes articles suggests that he is even aware of the ensuing controversy. No historian genuinely familiar with the crisis literature would trust the 1997 version, which the editors themselves finally acknowledged has been superseded by the much-improved 2001 Miller Center transcripts.

Hayes also accepts RFK's claim in13 Daysthat "many meetings" of the ExComm took place "without the President." [HY491] I listened to every recorded meeting numerous times over two years (including the crucial "post-crisis" meetings that connected into late November)—equally well equally checking passages in the original White Firm chief recordings against the copies used for research and studying the minutes of the unrecorded meetings. JFK definitely attended every ExComm meeting, except during brief campaign trips to New England (10/17) and the Midwest (10/xx).

The November mail-crisis lasted longer (32 days) and required more recorded meetings (24 vs. xix) than the iconic Xiii Days. [AV403-12] The naval blockade remained in place and tensions remained high after ten/28. Negotiations at the Un broke down over Soviet resistance to removing the IL-28 nuclear bombers from Cuba and the deadlock was non resolved until 11/20. JFK then ordered the lifting of the occludent, but not earlier RFK persuaded him to drop the non-invasion pledge: "I don't recollect," RFK insisted, "that nosotros owe anything equally far as Khrushchev is concerned." The president worried that it would "wait likewise much like we're welching" on our promise and added that retaining the pledge might "make it politically less difficult for Khrushchev to withdraw his conventional forces from Republic of cuba." In the end, even so, JFK agreed to his brother'south tougher opinion. Bobby was Bobby, hawkish to the last. Hayes never fifty-fifty mentions the November post-crunch—in consequence leaving out everything after the 9th inning in the account of an actress-inning game—a fitting metaphor for these essays. [AV410]. (1)

(ane) When I began listening to the tapes I did not expect that they would fatally undermine the veracity of13 Days. I had worked in RFK's presidential campaign, convinced that he was a very unlike man than in 1962. Nevertheless, every bit a historian, I had to face up the testify on the tapes. I admired Bobby in 1968, and all the same do.

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Source: https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/172974

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